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TORPEDOING A TRANSACTION: ECONOMIC
SUBSTANCE VERSUS OTHER TAX DOCTRINES
AND THE APPLICATION OF THE STRICT
LIABILITY PENALTY
THOMAS C. VANIK JR.
ABSTRACT
Transactions designed to intentionally reduce one’s taxes often attract suspicion
and become the subject of judicial review. To evaluate suspicious transactions,
courts have developed special common-law doctrines that impose additional
requirements beyond those in the Internal Revenue Code. These doctrines could be
considered standard methods of fact finding or legal interpretation, yet they have
taken on their own identity within court analyses with varying interpretations and
applications. An examination of cases demonstrates significant overlap in the
doctrines and exemplifies how the application of the doctrines adds confusion and
uncertainty to tax law. Compounding on this uncertainty is the codification of the
economic substance doctrine and related strict liability penalty for its violation,
which suggests that the distinct nature of the common-law doctrines is a false
assumption that only confuses tax law. Taxpayers, however, may be able to use the
confusion between doctrines to avoid the strict liability penalty by arguing that even
if a transaction is invalid, it is invalid not under the codified economic substance
doctrine, but under one of the common-law doctrines that does not impose strict
liability.
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INTRODUCTION
[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not
lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one
choose, to evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs that his
taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern
which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one’s taxes.1
Despite the above truism, transactions designed to intentionally reduce one’s
taxes attract a heavy dose of suspicion.2 As the predominant source of positive tax
law, the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) draws the brightest line regarding what
transactions are permissible and provides the basic framework for taxpayers to order
their affairs. “[T]he very meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may
go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it.”3 Courts, however, have developed
special common-law doctrines to help locate the line drawn by the Code under the
guise of executing Congress’s intent.4 These common-law doctrines, such as
business purpose and economic substance, are judicial creations that impose
additional requirements on transactions beyond those in the Code.5 While these
common-law doctrines have taken on their own identity within court analyses, they
could be considered standard methods of fact finding or legal interpretation.6 Yet,
the varying interpretations and applications of these doctrines have caused
uncertainty in tax law.7 This uncertainty appears to be avoidable, as “courts have
known for centuries how to determine that an ass bearing the label ‘horse’ is still an
ass.”8
The uncertainty surrounding the scope of these doctrines is now accentuated by
the recent codification of one of these common-law doctrines, the economic
substance doctrine,9 accompanied by a strict liability penalty for its violation.10
1

Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).

2

JASPER L. CUMMINGS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT’S FEDERAL TAX JURISPRUDENCE: AN
ANALYSIS OF FACT FINDING METHODS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION FROM THE COURT’S
TAX OPINIONS, 1801-PRESENT 62 (2010).
3

Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930).

4 See CUMMINGS, supra note 2, at xii, 3 (these special legal processes have come to be
known as “tax specific doctrines”).
5

Id. at xii.

6

Id.

7 Id. at 1. Compare Pasternak v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 893, 904 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying the
conjunctive test of the two-pronged economic substance doctrine to find leasing schemes
invalid), with Sacks v. Comm’r, 69 F.3d 982, 991-92 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the two prongs
of the economic substance doctrine merely as factors to consider in finding a sale-leaseback
transaction valid).
8

CUMMINGS, supra note 2, at 4.

9

See I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2012).
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Notwithstanding the language of the strict liability penalty provision,11 the Internal
Revenue Service has stated that it will not pursue the strict liability penalty with any
transaction that is more appropriately analyzed under a doctrine other than the
economic substance doctrine.12 Such a position demonstrates the IRS’s confidence
that the economic substance doctrine is not only separate and distinct from the other
common-law doctrines, but also that it can be easily distinguished from other
doctrines. This assumption may cause more trouble than the IRS anticipates.
Part I explores the foundation of the most popular common-law tax doctrines,
along with important cases illustrating their application. Part II tests these
foundations by (1) analyzing each case using different common-law doctrines to
demonstrate the significant overlap in their application and analysis, and (2) showing
how these overlaps are apparent in the newly codified economic substance doctrine.
Finally, Part III explains this confusion by arguing that all or most of these doctrines
can be seen as merely variations of a singular doctrine: substance over form. If true,
this malleability may permit taxpayers seeking to avoid the application of the
recently enacted penalty to argue that while the transaction fails, it fails under a
doctrine other than economic substance.
I. COMMON LAW DOCTRINES LEADING UP TO CODIFICATION
Transactions intentionally structured to reduce tax fall into three categories: (1)
transactions intended by Congress to further an economic, social, political, or
administrative objective; (2) transactions that Congress does not intend, but which
share a common fact pattern that supports a statutory response; and (3) transactions
that Congress does not intend, but which do not share a common fact pattern and are
of an idiosyncratic nature.13 The latter two categories are abusive transactions that
should not be given effect. The legislature can address abusive transactions that
share a common fact pattern by passing statutory amendments to the Code.14 This
reactive and mechanical approach to abusive transactions is a rules-based
approach.15 The third category of one-off transactions, however, is best addressed
10

See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2012).

11 See id. (providing that the strict liability penalty is applied to any transaction failing the
economic substance doctrine or other “similar rule of law”).
12

Heather C. Maloy, Large Bus. & Int’l Div., IRS, LB&I-4-07-015, Guidance for
Examiners and Managers on the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine and Related
Penalties (July 15, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Guidance-for-Examiners-andManagers-on-the-Codified-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-Related-Penalties [hereinafter
LB&I, Guidance]; Heather C. Maloy, Large Bus. & Int’l Div., IRS, LMSB-20-0919-024,
Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties (Sept. 14, 2010),
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Codification-of-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-RelatedPenalties [hereinafter LB&I, Codification].
13

DEBORAH A. GEIER, U.S. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 469 (2015).

14 Id. Examples include section 469 passive loss rules, section 465 at-risk rules, the capital
loss limitation in section 1211, the limitations of losses on dealings with related person in
section 267, the corporate net operating loss limitations in section 382, hobby loss rules in
section 183, and the wash sale rule of section 1091.
15 See Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and “Miscodifying” Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, 33
VA. TAX REV. 579, 586 (2014).
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through individual adjudication where a court will determine if the transaction
complies with Congress’s intent.16 The granddaddy of this standards-based approach
is the substance over form doctrine, with the other common-law doctrines best seen
as its progeny.17
The substance over form doctrine is not peculiar to tax law.18 It has been and
continues to be a staple in many legal contexts, and allows a court to look beyond
mere formalities to discern the true nature of the facts to correctly apply the law.19
Hence, the substance over form doctrine is used in a wide variety of legal fields as a
standard method of fact finding.20 In tax law, this standards-based approach allows
the government to combat tax abuse in situations where the rules-based approach of
the Code falls short.21
An emblematic application of the substance over form doctrine in tax law can be
found in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner.22 In Old Colony Trust, the
taxpayer, Mr. Wood, negotiated an employment contract providing that his employer
would pay the income taxes owed on his salary directly to the IRS and state revenue
agency.23 Mr. Wood did not include the cash paid to satisfy his tax obligation in his
gross income, but the IRS argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the tax paid
by the company constituted additional compensation under his employment
contract.24 While in form it was a payment of cash by the company to a third party,
in substance, it was additional compensation for services rendered by Mr. Wood.25
Another similar standards-based approach is the sham transaction doctrine,
which allows a court to deny the legal effect of a transaction that appears fictitious.26
“Sham,” the operative word, is defined as “[s]omething that is not what it seems; a
16

GEIER, supra note 13, at 469.

17

Jellum, supra note 15, at 595-97.

18

CUMMINGS, supra note 2, at 333.

19

Id.

20

For example, the analysis has been used in contract law to establish that nominal
consideration does not create a contract. See, e.g., Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29, 29 (1861)
(finding that an agreement to pay beneficiaries $200 in consideration of one cent was not a
contract but rather a promise to make a gift even though it satisfied the formal requirements
for formation of a contract). Similarly, it has been used in corporate law to disregard the
corporate entity for limited liability purposes. See, e.g., Mangan v. Terminal Transp. Sys., 286
N.Y.S. 666, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936) (finding that the defendant’s taxi-cab companies were
mere devices to shelter the owner from the liabilities of ownership).
21

While the rules-based approach has the advantage of certainty, “[i]t forces Congress and
the Treasury to be reactive rather than proactive, as innovative taxpayers find new ways to
work around the language of the rules.” Jellum, supra note 15, at 586.
22

279 U.S. 716 (1929).

23

Id. at 718-20.

24

Id. at 729-31.

25

Id.

26

See Karen Nelson Moore, Sham Transaction Doctrine: An Outmoded and Unnecessary
Approach to Combating Tax Avoidance, 41 FLA. L. REV. 659, 659 (1989); Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr., The Sham Transaction Doctrine, 145 TAX NOTES 1239, 1242 (Dec. 15, 2014).
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counterfeit.”27 While the Supreme Court has never used the term “sham transaction
doctrine,” Knetsch v. United States is often credited for identifying a transaction as a
“sham.”28
In Knetsch, Mr. Knetsch bought a single premium deferred annuity savings
bonds paying 2.5% interest with mostly nonrecourse debt (borrowed from the
insurance company itself) charging 3.5% interest.29 Mr. Knetsch also immediately
borrowed the first year’s interest payment from the insurance company and deducted
the prepaid interest on his tax return.30 The contract allowed Mr. Knetsch to borrow
the excess of the stated cash or loan value at year-end over the amount of his
indebtedness.31 He continued this arrangement for three years and deducted the
interest payments each year.32 In the fourth year, Mr. Knetsch terminated his
contract by surrendering the bonds to the company, cancelling his indebtedness, and
generating a small cash payment.33 In disallowing the interest deductions, the
Supreme Court found that the loan arrangement between Mr. Knetsch and the
insurance company that putatively sold him the deferred annuity was a “fiction” and
a “sham.”34 It was pretend debt intended only to create a series of “interest”
deductions for Mr. Knetsch.
A similar standards-based approach often employed by the courts is the step
transaction doctrine, which allows a court to treat multiple steps or series of closely
related transactions as one event for tax purposes.35 Additionally, courts have used
the step transaction doctrine to disaggregate the final result of a series of transactions
to analyze each step.36 For example, the Supreme Court applied the step transaction
doctrine to prevent the avoidance of gain recognition by a corporation in Minnesota
Tea Co. v. Helvering.37
27

Sham, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1585 (10th ed. 2014).

28

Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960).

29

Id. at 362-63.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 363.

32

Id. The interest deductions would have been used to offset income during a period of
time in which the highest marginal income tax rate reached ninety-one percent.
33 Id. The context in which purported debt is most at risk of being considered “sham debt”
is when a property seller also finances the sale and the sale price demonstrably exceeds the
fair market value of the property. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 1045,
1046-47 (9th Cir. 1976).
34

Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 366.

35

See Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989); see also Philip Sancilio, Note,
Clarifying (or is it Codifying?) the “Notably Abstruse”: Step Transactions, Economic
Substance, and the Tax Code, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 138, 148-49 (2013) (comparing the step
transaction doctrine to the newly codified economic substance doctrine).
36
See, e.g., Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938); Crenshaw v. United
States, 450 F.2d 472, 476 (5th Cir. 1971); Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234,
1244 (5th Cir. 1983).
37

Minn. Tea Co., 302 U.S. at 609.
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In Minnesota Tea Co., the plaintiff company sold property and immediately
distributed the cash to its shareholders, purportedly in pursuance of a plan of
reorganization, in return for an agreement by the shareholders to assume the debts of
the company.38 Had the company retained the cash and paid its creditors directly, it
would have been taxed on the gain realized from the property sale.39 In applying the
step transaction doctrine, the Supreme Court treated the two transactions as one,
finding that the distribution to shareholders “was a meaningless and unnecessary
incident in the transmission of the fund to the creditors, all along intended to come to
their hands” and that the shareholders acted as a “mere conduit” of the payment to
creditors.40
Helvering v. Gregory is universally accepted as the father of the business purpose
doctrine, which states that the structure of a transaction must serve a bona fide
business purpose other than tax avoidance to be respected.41 Mrs. Gregory, the
wealthy sole shareholder of a corporation, wanted to obtain portfolio investment
stock owned by such corporation without triggering the high ordinary income tax
rate applied to dividend distributions at the time in order to sell the stock to a
buyer.42 Thus, she created a subsidiary (Averill), transferred the stock to it, and had
Averill stock distributed to herself in a transaction purporting to satisfy the tax-free
“reorganization” provisions of the Code.43 She then liquidated Averill, which
triggered no tax to the liquidating corporation at the time.44 If the form of this
purported corporate “reorganization” were respected, the transaction would have
allowed her to receive the portfolio stock that she wished to sell to her buyer as
partially tax-free basis recovery and partially low-taxed capital gain (instead of
entirely as high taxed dividend income).45
In refusing to give effect to the purported “reorganization,” Judge Learned Hand
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that although the transaction
followed all of the formal requirements of a reorganization, Congress did not intend
to cover such a transaction in the reorganization rules when the subsidiary neither

38

Id. at 610.

39

Id. at 612-13. Under section 112(d)(1) and (2) of the Revenue Act of 1928, any boot
received that was not “distributed” pursuant to a plan of reorganization resulted in taxable
gain recognition to the recipient. By immediately distributing the cash proceeds from the asset
sale, purportedly in connection with a plan of reorganization, the company argued that it
satisfied the literal requirements of this section.
40

Id. at 613.

41

Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).

42 Id. at 809-10. If Mrs. Gregory would have caused the corporation to declare and pay a
dividend to her in the form of the stock it would have triggered dividend treatment at a time in
history when dividends were not eligible to be taxed at the preferential capital gains rate, as
they are today. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2012).
43

Id. The relevant reorganization provision during that time was section 112 of the
Revenue Act of 1928.
44

Id.

45

GEIER, supra note 13, at 484-85.
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conducted business nor owned any business assets and the transaction was entered
into solely for the purpose of tax avoidance.46
After Gregory, courts began to consider whether a transaction changed, or had
the potential to change, the economic position of the taxpayer (apart from tax
savings purporting to arise under the transaction, if respected).47 In Goldstein v.
Commissioner, for example, the judicially created “economic substance principle”48
was used to disallow prepaid interest deductions taken by a taxpayer for loans that
had no “purpose, substance or utility apart from their anticipated tax
consequences.”49
In Goldstein, Mrs. Goldstein, a recent winner of the Irish lottery, borrowed cash
at an interest rate of 4%, which was used, along with a portion of her winnings, to
purchase United States Treasury notes paying a return between 0.5% and 1.5%.50
Apart from tax considerations, the investment was a sure economic loser.51 But Mrs.
Goldstein then prepaid the interest owed on the loans for several years in the same
year she included her lottery winnings, which would otherwise be taxed at high
marginal rates.52 Her son, an accountant who devised and executed the transaction,
anticipated that the $18,500 economic loss due to the interest rate differential
between the borrowed cash and Treasury return would be more than offset by the
anticipated $55,000 in tax savings arising from the prepaid interest deduction.53 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s disallowance of the
deductions and found that Mrs. Goldstein did not enter into the transaction with the
purpose of attaining an economic gain but only to obtain interest deductions.54
The business purpose doctrine and economic substance principle were ultimately
combined into what has become known as the “economic substance doctrine” in
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States.55 As courts began to invoke this doctrine to strike
down transactions determined to be outside the purview of congressional intent, the
46 Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810-11. In affirming the Second Circuit’s opinion, the Supreme
Court stated that the transaction was “[s]imply an operation having no business or corporate
purpose.” Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
47

See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960); see also Goldstein v. Comm’r,
364 F.2d 734, 740 (2d Cir. 1966).
48

Jellum, supra note 15, at 598-99.

49

Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 740.

50

Id. at 736-37.

51

See GEIER, supra note 13, at 486. The U.S. Treasury bonds, which were among the
safest investments, were earning Mrs. Goldstein interest between 0.5% and 1.5%. Yet, she
was paying 4% interest on the loans used to purchase the Treasury bonds. Goldstein, 364 F.2d
at 739.
52

Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 736-37.

53

Id. at 736; see also GEIER, supra note 13, at 485-86.

54

Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 738.

55

435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978). In Frank Lyon, the Court combined the concepts behind
the business purpose doctrine, requiring a bona fide business purpose rather than mere tax
avoidance, with the economic substance principle, requiring the transaction to change or have
the potential to change the taxpayer’s economic position aside from any tax benefits. Id.
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federal circuit courts began to apply the doctrine inconsistently.56 In response to this
inconsistency, Congress codified the common-law economic substance doctrine in
section 7701(o) of the Code in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010.57
The codified version of the economic substance doctrine in section 7701(o)
requires satisfaction of two elements for a transaction to be respected for tax
purposes. First, the transaction must change the taxpayer’s economic position (apart
from tax effects) in a meaningful way.58 Second, the taxpayer must have a
substantial purpose (apart from tax effects) for entering into the transaction.59
Essentially, this section codified the business purpose doctrine and economic
substance principle into a “conjunctive” economic substance doctrine.60 Aside from
clarifying that the conjunctive test is required, section 7701(o)(5) provides that the
economic substance doctrine is the same as “the common law doctrine”61 and is
applicable to a transaction “in the same manner as if this subsection had never been
enacted.”62
56 A majority of courts applied a “conjunctive” test, which required the taxpayer to
establish both the economic substance prong and the business purpose prong. See, e.g., Coltec
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355-57 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Several courts,
however, applied a “disjunctive” test, which required the taxpayer to establish either
economic substance or a business purpose. See, e.g., Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r,
752 F.2d 89, 96 (4th Cir. 1985). Yet, other courts used a “holistic” test in which they
considered economic substance and business purpose in conjunction with other factors. See,
e.g., Casebeer v. Comm’r, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990). See generally Richard M.
Lipton, ‘Codification’ of the Economic Substance Doctrine— Much Ado About Nothing? 112
J. TAX’N 325, 326 (2010) (describing the “conjunctive” and “disjunctive” labels); Sancilio,
supra note 35, at 146-47 (describing the “holistic” label).
57 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §
1409, 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-70 (codified at I.R.C. § 7701(o)). Commentators suggest three
reasons for the codification of the economic substance doctrine: (1) to clarify the meaning of
the test, (2) to establish uniformity among courts by requiring the conjunctive test as the
proper legal standard, and (3) to obtain tax revenue from the enforcement of the doctrine that
could be scored officially as a revenue raiser (unlike the application of the common-law
doctrine), as well as raising revenue from the newly enacted penalty. See GEIER, supra note
12, at 487-88; see also Jerald David August, The Codification of the Economic Substance
Doctrine, Part II, 12 No. 6 BUS. ENTITIES 4, 8-10 (2010).
58

I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A) (2012).

59 Id. § 7701(o)(1)(B). This test requires both parts to be satisfied and is known as the
“conjunctive” test.
60

It is worth noting that the business purpose doctrine continues to be an independent
doctrine apart from its prong in the economic substance doctrine.
61

I.R.C. § 7701(0)(5)(A).

62

Id. § 7701(o)(5)(C). Although the rationale for codification does not appear to reflect
the concern for treaty shopping, the broad language of the Code section may permit an
application of the economic substance doctrine and related penalty to transactions involving
treaty shopping. See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD
PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 254 (4th ed. 2011). Treaty shopping is the
practice of taxpayers establishing corporate vehicles in a country (country 1) different from
the one where the economic activities occur (country 2) in order to take advantage of a tax
treaty between the U.S. and country 1. See id. at 244.
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At the same time that it enacted section 7701(o), Congress amended section 6662
to impose a strict liability penalty of twenty percent for any underpayment
attributable to “[a]ny disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction
lacking economic substance (within the meaning of section 7701(o)) or failing to
meet the requirements of any similar rule of law.”63 Notwithstanding this language,
the IRS has stated that the strict liability penalty is limited only to the application of
the economic substance doctrine and that no such penalty will be assessed if the
transaction is susceptible to attack under other non-economic substance doctrines,
such as the substance over form doctrine or the step transaction doctrine.64
Furthermore, the IRS recently clarified that “similar rule of law” is intended to
mean the application of the same factors and analysis as the economic substance
doctrine in section 7701(o) regardless of the label used.65 The IRS appears to have
taken this position without considering whether the economic substance doctrine is
applicable in contexts independent from the other common-law doctrines and
whether courts can easily determine whether a transaction is susceptible to challenge
only under the economic substance doctrine, as opposed to another common-law
doctrine. Comparison of the doctrines is warranted to shed light on whether the
current IRS position is justified or sustainable.
II. THE DOCTRINES AND THEIR FOUNDATIONAL CASES
The strict liability penalty provisions for violation of the economic substance
doctrine, along with the current IRS position relating to its application, leaves the
future of such tax litigation in uncertainty. The most recent notice defining “similar
rule of law” uses the “sham transaction doctrine” as an example of a different label
attaching the same factors and analysis as the section 7701(o) economic substance
doctrine, which is, therefore, a “similar rule of law.”66 The same notice, as well as
prior IRS guidance, uses substance over form and step transaction doctrine as
examples of non-similar rules of law that will not cause the section 6662(b)(6) strict
liability penalty to apply.67 Taken at face value, it appears that the IRS is confident
63 I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2012) (emphasis added). This penalty is raised to forty percent if
no disclosure is made at the time of filing the return. See id. § 6662(i). Additionally, unlike
other penalty provisions described in section 6662, there is no “reasonable cause exception.”
Id. § 6664(c)(2).
64

See LB&I, Guidance, supra note 12; LB&I, Codification, supra note 12; see also
Richard M. Lipton, IRS Provides Helpful Guidance to Agents, 115 J. TAX’N 116, 121-23
(2011).
65 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (2014). The notice relied on the
legislative history, which states that the “penalty would apply to a transaction that is
disregarded as a result of the application of the same factors and analysis that is required
under the provision [section 7701(o)] for an economic substance analysis, even if a different
term is used to describe the doctrine.” H.R. Rep. No. 111-443(I), at 304 n.161 (2010).
66 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, supra note 65. According to a Treasury official, however,
Notice 2014-58 was not intended to call the sham transaction doctrine a similar rule of law but
only to establish that a similar rule of law is any analysis where the two-prong test is applied.
William R. Davis, Economic Substance Notice Not Intended to Implicate All Shams, TAX
NOTES TODAY, at 1 (Jan. 23, 2015).
67 Compare I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, supra note 65, with I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40
I.R.B. 411 (2010).
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that the doctrines are easily distinguishable. As some scholars have pointed out,
however, this is not true.68
These inconsistencies raise several questions about the future of tax litigation in
relation to the strict liability penalty of section 6662(b)(6). By analyzing each tax
doctrine in its paradigmatic context and applying the other common tax doctrines to
each case we can determine that there is significant overlap among the doctrines.69
This inquiry also reveals the prospect for a defendant taxpayer to invoke any one of
the non-economic substance doctrines to avoid the strict liability penalty of section
6662(b)(6).
A. Substance Over Form & Old Colony Trust
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner is an exemplary case for the application
of the substance over form doctrine. In form, the company paid cash directly to the
IRS; but in substance the company paid additional cash salary to Mr. Wood “in
consideration of the services rendered by the employee.”70 Mr. Wood then paid the
cash to the IRS and state tax authorities to satisfy his personal tax obligation.71 A
similar result could follow from a sham transaction doctrine analysis with the sole
difference being in the language used. Under a sham transaction analysis, the Court
would likely have found the direct payment of taxes by the employer to be a mere
“fiction” with the “reality” of the transaction being a payment in consideration for
services rendered.72
Additionally, the language of the opinion also suggests amenability to the step
transaction doctrine. While the step transaction doctrine is often invoked to combine
a series of steps into one transaction for analysis, it can also be used to break apart a
single transaction into its implicit, but distinct, steps for individual analysis.73 As a
whole, the transaction appears to be a simple payment of tax liability by the
company, but as the Court said, this payment was the “equivalent to receipt by the
person taxed” with subsequent payment to the IRS.74 Therefore, applying the step
transaction doctrine would show the first step as a payment of compensation to Mr.
Wood for services rendered and a subsequent second step of a payment by Mr.
Wood to the IRS for his tax liability.75
Although no language in the opinion hints at how the Court would have decided
under the two prongs of the economic substance doctrine of section 7701(o), an
application of the business purpose doctrine and economic substance principle
68 See, e.g., GEIER, supra note 13, at 469 n.1; CUMMINGS, supra note 2, at 152-56; Jellum,
supra note 15, at 132; Sancilio, supra note 35, at 138.
69

Since the two prongs of the economic substance doctrine reflect the common law
economic substance principle and business purpose doctrine, I will apply each of these two
doctrines separately throughout this analysis.
70

Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929).

71

Id.

72

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

73

See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.

74

Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 729.

75

Cf. id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss1/8

10

2015]

TORPEDOING A TRANSACTION

119

illuminates how Old Colony Trust would have come out under a section 7701(o)
challenge. The business purpose doctrine requires a transaction to serve a bona fide
business purpose other than tax avoidance.76 What sort of business purpose could be
served by assuming a liability not properly allocable to the company? A weak
argument for a business purpose would be that it served as an employment incentive
by eliminating his tax liability. This argument clearly collapses upon itself as it not
only identifies the payment as compensation (akin to a bonus), which is taxable to
the recipient, but it fails to demonstrate how structuring the payment as an
assumption of tax liability, rather than a cash bonus, serves any purpose other than to
reduce tax.
The company could have achieved the same employment incentive purpose by a
grossed-up cash payment to Mr. Wood.77 Of course, this would require a sum of
money larger than the current payment to be paid, as it would account for the tax
liability, but would serve the purpose of paying the employee’s tax liability. The
only purpose of a direct payment by the company to the IRS was to compensate the
employee without, they hoped, a gross income inclusion by Mr. Wood. The
company acted as a “conduit” of the payment of Mr. Wood’s tax liability.78 Hence,
the transaction lacked a purpose other than to reduce tax and violated the business
purpose doctrine.79
The economic substance principle requires the transaction to change or have the
potential to change a taxpayer’s economic position apart from the tax
consequences.80 The only effect of this transaction was to eliminate the tax Mr.
Wood would otherwise owe on his compensation. There is no potential for Mr.
Wood, or the company, to reap any economic gain aside from paying a cumulative
lower amount to absolve the tax liability of Mr. Wood. Since there is no other aspect
of this transaction besides a direct payment to the IRS rather than to Mr. Wood as
additional cash compensation, the transaction lacks economic substance and was
only entered into for tax reduction purposes.81
B. Sham Transaction & Knetsch
In holding that Mr. Knetsch’s arrangement to buy deferred annuity bonds with
loan proceeds borrowed from the annuity seller in order to take “interest” deductions
was a sham, the Supreme Court focused on the reality of the loans and found them to
be a “facade” and a “fiction.”82 The Court based its analysis on the meaning of
“indebtedness” and found that the nonrecourse nature of the debt (giving Mr.
Knetsch little risk of economic loss) and the terms of the arrangement between Mr.
76

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

77

A grossed-up cash payment is a calculated payment above the desired compensation to
the employee that accounts for the tax liability. See GEIER, supra note 12, at 136; see also
Mark Maremont, Latest Twist in Corporate Pay: Tax-Free Income for Executives, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 22, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113521937434129170.
78

See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).

79

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

80

See cases cited supra note 47 and accompanying text.

81

See cases cited supra note 47 and accompanying text.

82

Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960).
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Knetsch and the lender was not true indebtedness as contemplated by the statute.83
The substance over form doctrine is explicitly indicated by the trial judge’s opinion
and recited in the Supreme Court’s opinion: “while in form the payments to Sam
Houston [Life Insurance Company] were compensation for the use or forbearance of
money, they were not in substance.”84 Instead of focusing on the sham nature of the
transaction, the Supreme Court’s opinion could have rested on finding that, in form,
the transaction was a loan arrangement providing deductible interest payments, but
in substance it was merely a fee to the company to help create the appearance of
interest payments.
Although not explicitly indicated, by analyzing the purchase of the deferred
annuity bonds in conjunction with the borrowing from the annuity seller, the Court
applied the step transaction doctrine. Viewed superficially, Mr. Knetsch took out a
valid loan with deductible interest payments, and Mr. Knetsch invested the loan
proceeds in valid deferred annuity bonds, both of which are legitimate endeavors that
are usually respected for tax purposes.85 It is only when the purported seller and
lender are the same person and the underlying economic investment is so weak86
that circular cash flow begins to look, not like real debt invested in a real financial
instrument, but rather a facade to create the appearance of deductible “interest.”
The application of the business purpose doctrine in this case provides perspective
on the evolution of judicial opinions combatting tax abuse. While the lower court
found that the “only motive in purchasing these 10 bonds was to attempt to secure an
interest deduction,” the Supreme Court refused to follow this reasoning by
reinforcing the concept that taxpayers enjoy the legal right to decrease their taxes by
any means the law permits, as stated in Gregory.87 The Supreme Court appeared to
reject the idea that this transaction violated Gregory’s business purpose doctrine,
which contemplates looking at the intention or motive of the taxpayer in entering the
transaction.88 This is somewhat troubling as there was no other incentive for this
transaction to Mr. Knetsch aside from the interest deductions he was attempting to
claim.89 The bare bones of the arrangement, which he likely entered into at the
encouragement of the insurance company, had Mr. Knetsch paying the insurance
company a fee in exchange for purported interest deductions.90 The particular
doctrine makes little difference in the end, however, as the Court had a variety of
other tax doctrines at its disposal to strike the transaction down.

83

See id.

84

Id. at 364-65.

85

Id. at 363.

86

“It was stipulated that if Knetsch had held the bonds to maturity [when Knetsch would
be 90 years of age] and continued annually to borrow the net cash value less $1,000, the sum
available for the annuity at maturity would be $1,000 . . . enough to provide an annuity of only
$43 per month.” Id. at 364.
87

See id. at 365 (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)).

88

See id.

89

See id. at 366.

90

See Cummings, supra note 26, at 1249.
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An analysis under the economic substance principle would closely resemble the
Second Circuit’s reasoning in Goldstein.91 The annuity contract Mr. Knetsch entered
into would earn 2.5% interest return from the insurance company, while he agreed to
pay 3.5% interest to the same insurance company on the loan used to purchase the
investment.92 Absent the tax savings from the interest deductions, the investment
arrangement was a “sure economic loser.”93 Similar to Goldstein, an application of
the economic substance principle to Mr. Knetsch’s arrangement would have found
that he did not enter into the transaction with the purpose of attaining an economic
gain but only to obtain interest deductions.94
C. Step Transaction & Minnesota Tea Co.
The step transaction doctrine allows a court to either aggregate multiple steps of
a transaction as one event or to disaggregate a seemingly single transaction into a
series of steps.95 The Supreme Court in Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering used the
step transaction doctrine to aggregate an immediate distribution of proceeds from the
sale of property to shareholders and the assumption of those shareholders of the
liabilities of the company.96 By aggregating the two steps, the Court determined that
the transactions equated to a single step in which the company retained the sales
proceeds and used them to pay its creditors directly.97
In similar fashion to Old Colony Trust, it appears that the substance over form
doctrine mirrors the application of the step transaction doctrine in Minnesota Tea
Co. The Supreme Court itself states “that by this roundabout process petitioner
received the same benefit ‘as though it had retained that amount from distribution
and applied it to the payment of such indebtedness.’”98 The Court could have plainly
stated that, in form, this was a distribution to shareholders with a subsequent
assumption of liabilities by those shareholders, but, in substance, it was merely a
payment by the company to creditors from the sales proceeds without distribution.
The Court would have likely come out the same way under the sham transaction
doctrine. It appears that the Supreme Court initially phrased the issue as a sham
transaction question by focusing on whether the distribution to the shareholders
satisfied the meaning of a “distribution” as contemplated by the reorganization
statute to permit tax-free treatment of the gain.99 Like Knetsch, which focused on the
91 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. The reason why the Goldstein court
could not rely on the sham debt doctrine is that Mrs. Goldstein was careful to borrow from an
independent third-party bank, not the U.S. government (the seller of the investment in the
form of Treasury bonds). See Goldstein v. Comm’r, 364 F.2d 736, 736 (2d Cir. 1966).
92

Knetsch 364 U.S. at 362-63.

93

GEIER, supra note 13, at 486.

94

See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.

95

See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.

96

Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938).

97

Id.

98

Id. (quoting Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co., 89 F.2d 711, 715 (8th Cir. 1937)).

99

“The question for determination is whether the delivery of the [purported distribution]
by petitioner to the stockholders, an equal sum thereafter being applied by them to the
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meaning of “indebtedness,” the Supreme Court would have focused on the meaning
of “distribution” and likely held that since the proceeds from the purported
distribution to shareholders were immediately used to satisfy the debts of the
corporation, it was not a “distribution” as intended by the reorganization statute. The
Court itself stated in the opinion that the distribution to the shareholders was “so
transparently artificial that further discussion would be a needless waste of time.”100
Therefore, the distribution was a sham.
The language of the opinion also clearly implicates the business purpose
doctrine. The Supreme Court stated that “[t]he preliminary distribution to the
stockholders was a meaningless and unnecessary incident in the transmission of the
fund to the creditors.”101 By highlighting the “meaningless and unnecessary” nature
of the distribution, the Court established that the transaction had no business purpose
aside from tax avoidance.102 The overall purpose of the transaction was to satisfy the
liabilities to the creditors, but the structure of the transaction as a distribution to
shareholders in return for their assumption of those liabilities was designed only to
avoid taxes.
Quite clearly there was no realistic possibility of economic profit from the
unnecessary distribution step to the company. The distribution was not exercised
with the hope of profit potential or even a non-economic, non-tax purpose. The
structure was intended only to avoid the gain that would have been recognized for
tax purposes had the company not distributed the proceeds in a plan of
reorganization.103
D. Business Purpose & Gregory
The decision in Helvering v. Gregory104 is credited with creating the modern
business purpose doctrine.105 In Gregory, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to give effect to the purported reorganization as a means of transferring the
portfolio stock to Mrs. Gregory because the subsidiary “conducted no business” and
had “one purpose to reduce taxes.”106

payment of petitioner’s debts in pursuance of the resolution, constituted a distribution within
the meaning of the provisions of [the reorganization statute].” Id. at 612.
100

Id. at 613.

101

Id.

102

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

103 Interestingly, the shareholders may have had the potential to earn a profit on the
transaction. The distribution granted shareholders access to immediate cash in exchange for
assumption of the liabilities. The company, however, did not stipulate when the liabilities had
to be paid. Therefore, it is possible that a shareholder could have invested the “distribution” in
the interim between receipt and payment to the creditors, providing an economic profit
potential. The economic substance doctrine, however, clearly focuses on the economic
substance and business purpose from the taxpayer’s perspective, which was the corporation in
this case.
104

69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).

105

See GEIER, supra note 13, at 486.

106

Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810.
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The court’s language could equally be viewed, however, as simply concluding
that the substance of the transaction, while cast in the form of a reorganization, was a
simple dividend of the portfolio stock to Mrs. Gregory.107 Indeed, further in the
opinion, the court stated that the transfer of property to the subsidiary “was not a true
‘reorganization’” but “was merely the declaration of a dividend” by the parent
company to Mrs. Gregory.108 This language clearly implicates the substance over
form doctrine, as the court was essentially stating the transaction was, in form, a
reorganization but in substance, merely a taxable distribution. Any discussion of the
lack of business purpose could have simply been a rationalization of the finding that
the transaction was a taxable distribution in substance.109
The court also performed a sham transaction doctrine analysis by considering
whether the purported reorganization satisfied the meaning of “reorganization” under
the statute in effect at that time.110 Mrs. Gregory argued that the transaction
consisted of a valid spin-off followed by a valid liquidation and literally complied
with the statute.111 In explicitly stating that the transactions “were a sham,” the court
imposed a business purpose requirement into the reorganization statute and held that
it was not a true reorganization within the meaning of such statute since it had no
purpose aside from tax avoidance.112 Therefore, the reorganization as a whole was a
sham.
While not often considered a step transaction case, there is a clear application of
this doctrine, as well, in Gregory. The court itself stated that all the “steps were
real,” thereby implying that, when viewed in isolation, the reorganization and
liquidation would be upheld as valid transactions.113 Rather than exploring the
divisive reorganization and liquidation independently for tax purposes, however, the
court aggregated the two steps together to find only one event: a taxable distribution
of property.114
No discussion of the economic substance of the transaction was explicitly
performed in the opinion because it is a relatively recent doctrine, but its application
could have followed the business purpose analysis. Because the subsidiary was not
created to conduct any business activities, there was no profit potential in the
reorganization/liquidation structure.115 The “gain” from the creation and liquidation
of the subsidiary rested solely in the purported tax benefits it produced for Mrs.
Gregory.116

107

See CUMMINGS, supra note 2, at 87-92.

108

Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810.

109

See CUMMINGS, supra note 2, at 87-92.

110

See Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810-11.

111

Id. at 810.

112

See id. at 811; see also Cummings, supra note 26, at 1246-48.

113

Gregory, 69 F.2d at 811.

114

See id. 811.

115

See id.

116

Id. at 810.
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E. Economic Substance Principle & Goldstein
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Goldstein v. Commissioner found that
Mrs. Goldstein’s arrangement of borrowing at 4% interest to invest in Treasury notes
paying only about 1.5%, coupled with prepayment of the (deductible) interest in the
same year in which her lottery winnings were included in her gross income, “was not
to derive any economic gain or to improve here [sic] beneficial interest; but was
solely an attempt to obtain an interest deduction as an offset to her sweepstake
winnings.”117 Considering that such an arrangement was a sure economic loser
(apart from tax savings), Mrs. Goldstein lacked any non-tax profit potential.118
An inference of a substance over form doctrine can again be made, however,
from the opinion’s language. “[W]hile on its face purporting to be a debtor-creditor
transaction between a taxpayer and a bank, in fact there can be a situation where the
banks itself is, in effect, directly investing in the securities.”119 Stated differently,
the arrangement reflected, in form, bona fide loans arising from a valid debtorcreditor relationship but in substance, an investment by the bank in the Treasury
notes. Therefore, the court would not give effect to the taxpayer’s purported interest
deductions.
The Goldstein court refused to follow the lower court’s holding that the loan
arrangements were shams and, instead, considered them to be bona fide loans.120
The loans were considered bona fide because the money was borrowed from a thirdparty bank (rather than from the party selling the investments as in Knetsch), the
loans, while secured, were recourse (meaning Mrs. Goldstein assumed economic risk
if the value of the Treasury bonds— the securing collateral— should fall below the
loan amounts), and the Treasury bonds were pledged as collateral security for a
significant period of time.121 In this manner, the loans did not represent “sham debt”
within the colloquial meaning of debt, but this does not entirely foreclose a “sham
transaction” analysis.122 The ultimate question remained whether the purported tax
benefit was encompassed in the meaning of the term “indebtedness” in what is now
section 163 of the Code.123 As in Gregory, the court in Goldstein first interpreted the
statute providing the purported tax benefit.124 Similar to Gregory, which imposed a
business purpose requirement into the reorganization statute, the court in Goldstein
imposed a “purposive activity,” in the sense of trying to earn a nontax profit, into the
117 Goldstein v. Comm’r, 364 F.2d 734, 738 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting Goldstein v. Comm’r,
44 T.C. 284, 295 (1965), aff’d, 264 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966)).
118

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.

119

Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 737.

120

Id. (distinguishing Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960)).

121

See id. at 737-40; see also GEIER, supra note 13, at 486.

122 Many tax professionals believe there is a distinction between “factual shams” and “legal
shams.” Courts have created this distinction by considering the process of comparing the facts
to the requirements in the Code as a “legal sham,” while a “factual sham” compares the facts
to a general definition outside of its peculiar definition in the Code. See Cummings, supra
note 26, at 1250.
123

See Cummings, supra note 26, at 1249.

124

See Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 737.
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interest deduction section.125 As in Knetsch, because the loan arrangement did not
have a purpose besides obtaining a tax deduction, it lacked such purposive activity
(nontax economic purpose) and therefore was not “indebtedness” as contemplated by
the Code section.
The step transaction analysis follows the earlier conclusion reached under the
substance over form doctrine: the arrangement was the equivalent of the bank
investing in the Treasury notes.126 Viewed independently, each step of the
arrangement was a valid transaction. The loans were made between Mrs. Goldstein
and a third-party bank, and the loan arrangement, viewed alone, was legitimate and
did not represent sham debt.127 Additionally, Treasury note investments are a
permitted and encouraged endeavor. Viewed together, however, the transaction was
essentially an investment by the bank in the Treasury bonds with Mrs. Goldstein as a
mere conduit to obtaining interest deductions.128
Application of the business purposes doctrine would also result in the
disallowance of the deductions. The court stated, “[I]n such a transaction the
taxpayer truly can be said to have paid a certain sum to the bank in return for the
‘facade’ of a loan transaction.”129 This language implies that there was no non-tax
purpose in the arrangement.130 On different facts, an investment in Treasury bonds
can serve a sufficient non-tax purpose as the interest income would indicate a true
profit potential if not purchased with borrowed funds requiring a higher interest cost.
However, there was no non-tax purpose in Mrs. Goldstein incurring the debt to
invest in the Treasury bonds because she had plenty of available funds from the
sweepstakes winnings to do so without incurring a net economic loss.
F. Codified Economic Substance Doctrine & Penalties
Scholars have suggested that the codification of the economic substance doctrine
has done little to change the doctrine’s application.131 Others have noted that the
codified version of the doctrine requires stricter scrutiny by requiring both a
“meaningful” change in the taxpayer’s economic position, as well as a “substantial
purpose” in entering into the transaction.132 The true power of the codification,

125 See id. at 741 (“Section 163(a) should be construed to permit the deductibility of
interest when a taxpayer has borrowed funds and incurred an obligation to pay interest in
order to engage in what with reason can be termed purposive activity.”) (emphasis added).
126

Cf. id. at 737.

127

Id. “Sham debt” is where the debt arrangement is fictitious and created only to claim
deductions for interest payments that do not really occur. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S.
361, 364-65 (1960).
128 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989); Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302
U.S. 609, 613 (1938); Crenshaw v. United States 450 F.2d 472, 476 (5th Cir. 1971); Sec.
Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 1983).
129

Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 737.

130

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

131

See Lipton, supra note 56, at 325.

132

See, e.g., CUMMINGS, supra note 2, at 212.
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however, comes from the adoption of the accompanying strict liability penalty in
section 6662(b)(6) for transactions that lack economic substance.133
Section 6662 generally imposes a twenty percent penalty on any “substantial
understatement of tax,” which can be abated if the taxpayer has “substantial
authority” for his position or has disclosed the details of the transaction.134
Additionally, the penalty will be excused if the taxpayer can establish a reasonable
cause for the underpayment or that he acted in good faith.135 For transactions that
fail the economic substance doctrine under section 7701(o), “[t]hese rules go out the
window.”136 Rather than basing imposition of the penalty on a “substantial
understatement,” the section 6662(b)(6) penalty is imposed any time a transaction
fails the economic substance doctrine.137 Additionally, there is no reasonable cause
exception for any transaction lacking economic substance.138 Finally, if the taxpayer
does not disclose the questionable transaction with his or her tax return, the twenty
percent penalty is increased to forty percent.139
Considering the high stakes of this penalty, the codified version of the economic
substance doctrine poses not only a threat to the validity of a taxpayer’s transaction
but may also result in a harsh and unjustified punishment.140 Not only could the
penalty deter legitimate tax planning but it may also change taxpayers’ approach to
tax litigation. In light of the IRS’s stated position that it will not apply the penalty in
non-economic substance doctrine cases, taxpayers with doomed transactions may
argue that their transaction is more properly struck down by such non-economic
substance doctrines as substance over form or step transaction to avoid the penalty.
Such a fear is based on the analysis developed above that the doctrines overlap
significantly.
III. THE OVERLAP OF THE DOCTRINES
What is evident from the case-by-case analysis in Part II is that the doctrines are
not wholly independent from one another but contain at least some overlap in their
application and analysis. This assertion appears to contradict recent IRS notices that
state the IRS will enforce the strict liability penalty only with respect to transactions
that fail the codified economic substance or a “similar rule of law.”141 In the IRS’s
133

See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Case Against a Strict Liability Economic
Substance Penalty, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 445, 459-62 (2011). The article describes how the
penalty is not justifiable as it is unfair and disproportionate. As the strictest tax penalty, there
is no evidence of a link between economic substance doctrine violations and the worst kinds
of tax abusive conduct. The Code already provides a sufficient penalty to deter such conduct,
and this penalty may result in the deterrence of legitimate tax planning conduct.
134

I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B), (C) (2012). These rules do not apply to “tax shelters.” Id.

135

Id. § 6664(c)(1) (2012).

136

GEIER, supra note 13, at 488.

137

I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2012).

138

Id. § 6664(c)(2) (hence its strict liability label).

139

Id. § 6662(i).

140

See Thomas, supra note 133, at 491-96.

141

See supra sources cited notes 63-65.
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view, the “similar rule of law” language appears to refer only to the two-part test
found in the statute, even if the words “economic substance” is not used.142 For
example, a recent IRS notice clarified the “similar rule of law” question by stating
that it “means a rule or doctrine that applies the same factors and analysis under
section 7701(o) for an economic substance analysis,” using the “sham transaction
doctrine” as an example.143
The same notice, however, maintained that the “substance over form doctrine”
and the “step transaction doctrine” are not “similar rules of law.”144 Naturally, this
language has led practitioners to believe that for strict liability penalty purposes, the
substance over form doctrine and the step transaction doctrine will not trigger the
penalty, while the sham transaction doctrine will.145 According to a Treasury
official, however, Notice 2014-58 was not intended to call the sham transaction
doctrine a similar rule of law, but only to establish that a similar rule of law is any
analysis where the statute’s two-prong test is applied.146
It appears, however, that where the economic substance doctrine (or sham
transaction doctrine) is applicable, the substance over form and step transaction
doctrine might apply as well.147 Some commentators believe that the economic
substance doctrine and substance over form doctrine differ in that the former
requires an inquiry into “why a taxpayer entered into a transaction and the benefits
derived from the transaction,” while the latter “looks at the true nature of the
transaction.”148 This difference is essentially a subjective versus an objective
inquiry. While this contrast may be accurate, the fallacy of distinguishing between
the two doctrines in this manner is that ascertaining the true nature of a transaction is
the ultimate goal of both of these (and other) doctrines.149 An inquiry into why a
taxpayer entered into the transaction is meant to illuminate the transaction’s true
nature.
What makes a transaction “tax-abusive” is whether Congress intended the
desired tax consequences in the Code.150 Each doctrine is designed to determine
whether a transaction is within Congress’s intent.151 The broadest tool in achieving
142

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.

143

See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (“To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must
find that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits
in entering the transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no
reasonably possibility of profit exists.”).
144

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

145

See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.

146

See Davis, supra note 66, at 1.

147

See supra Part II.

148 Richard M. Lipton, Flextronics, Sundrup, and the Application of the Economic
Substance Doctrine, 114 J. TAX’N 160, 161-62 (2011); see also Joseph Bankman, The
Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 12 (2000).
149

See CUMMINGS, supra note 2, at 347-50.

150

GEIER, supra note 13, at 469; CUMMINGS, supra note 2, at 217.

151

GEIER, supra note 13, at 469; CUMMINGS, supra note 2, at 217.
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this objective is the substance over form doctrine, which refuses to accept the
taxpayer’s chosen form of a transaction where the result is inconsistent with
Congress’s apparent intent, despite formal compliance with the Code’s language
regarding the particular form chosen.152 Treating a violation of one doctrine as
especially deserving of a penalty, which can be viewed as merely the alter ego of
another, only frustrates the purpose of these common-law doctrines.153
With the economic substance principle and business purpose doctrine acting
primarily as helpful tools in a substance over form inquiry, the step transaction
doctrine is most frequently employed to define the scope of the transaction.154 In
multiple step transactions, courts sometimes invoke the step transaction doctrine to
determine whether the transaction as a whole (or an individual step) lacks economic
substance or a valid business purpose. Notice 2014-58 demonstrates this use of the
step transaction doctrine in its attempt to clarify the definition of a “transaction” for
section 7701(o) purposes as including “any series of steps carried out as part of a
plan.”155 Additionally, section 7701(o)(5)(D) provides that “transaction” includes “a
series of transactions.”156 The legislative history of this section explains, “the
provision does not alter the court’s ability to aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise
recharacterize a transaction when applying the [economic substance] doctrine.”157
All of the cases considered in Parts I and II contemplated either breaking down a
transaction into multiple steps or combining multiple steps to view the transaction as
a whole. This approach is what allowed the courts to apply their common-law
doctrine of choice to disallow tax benefits. Therefore, in most cases where a court
invokes the economic substance doctrine, it could be argued that the court will
implicitly apply the step transaction doctrine to determine the scope of the
transaction in its application.
There is little sense in reading Notice 2014-58 to equate the sham transaction
doctrine with the economic substance doctrine, while separate and distinct from the
substance over form doctrine and step transaction doctrine. The IRS likely included
the sham transaction doctrine in the notice based upon some courts using “sham
transaction” language to describe what appears to be the economic substance
doctrine.158 While the Supreme Court has used “sham transaction” in an opinion,159

152

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

153

See Thomas, supra note 133, at 485-89.

154 Sancilio, supra note 35, at 148-50. Sancilio, as well as other scholars, consider the step
transaction doctrine to be an independent inquiry to disallow tax benefits on its own. I would
argue that the step transaction doctrine is best understood as the process of aggregating or
disaggregating steps in the transaction to define its scope followed by the application of
another common-law doctrine to disallow the purported tax benefits. In this manner, I disagree
with Sancilio that courts should apply the economic substance doctrine first with the step
transaction doctrine standing behind it as a backstop. See id. at 173-78.
155

I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, supra note 65 (referencing Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(1) (2010)).

156

I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(D) (2012).

157

H.R. Rep. No. 111-443(l), at 296.

158

See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2012); Duffie v. United
States, 600 F.3d 362, 378 (5th Cir. 2010); Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d
431, 440-41 (4th Cir. 2006); United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018
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it never has used “sham transaction doctrine.”160 The “sham transaction doctrine”
language, however, can credit its creation to lower court opinions, where it has been
used both liberally and inconsistently.161 While many appellate courts have used the
term to refer to the tests of the economic substance doctrine as defined in section
7701(o), the First and Seventh Circuits never used the term, and the Second, Tenth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits used the term differently than its meaning in the
economic substance doctrine in section 7701(o).162 This inconsistency among courts
shows the inherit danger in doctrinal labeling.
The sham transaction doctrine derives its analysis from the term “sham” meaning
“[s]omething that is not what it seems; a counterfeit.”163 Considering this, the sham
transaction doctrine appears to more closely resemble the substance over form
doctrine because it analyzes whether the appearance of the transaction (in form) is
really something else (in substance). The economic substance principle and business
purpose prongs of the economic substance doctrine in section 7701(o) are two ways
of discovering whether a transaction is not what it purports to be. This contention
can be demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Knetsch, where the Court
found the loans were a “sham” but refused to consider the “motive” of the
taxpayer.164 By refusing to consider why the taxpayer entered into the transaction,
the Supreme Court essentially disregarded a business purpose analysis. How, then,
could this sham transaction doctrine case be considered the equivalent of a section
7701(o) analysis (which would cause the imposition of the strict liability penalty
today) but not a substance over form doctrine (which would not)?165
From the Goldstein analysis described in Part II, the sham transaction doctrine
may not share the same overlap in application as the other common-law doctrines.166
In Goldstein, the court refused to call the loan arrangements “shams” because the
loans were obtained from a third party rather than the seller of the investment
purchased with the loan.167 Rather, the court focused on the lack of economic
substance or purpose of the overall investment in Treasury bonds with the borrowed
cash to disallow the deductions.168 In doing so, however, the Goldstein court
followed the same analysis as in Gregory, which has been considered by some
(rightly or wrongly) a sham transaction doctrine case (rather than a business purpose
(11th Cir. 2001); James v. Comm’r, 899 F.2d 905, 908-09 (10th Cir. 1990); Rose v. Comm’r,
868 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1989).
159

United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557, 567 (2013).

160

See Cummings, supra note 26, at 13.

161

See id. at 16-20.

162

See id. at 16.

163

See Sham, supra note 27, at 1585.
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See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365 (1960).
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This analysis assumes that the courts will interpret Notice 2014-58 to equate the sham
transaction doctrine with the economic substance doctrine.
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See supra Part II.E.
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See Goldstein v. Comm’r, 364 F.2d 734, 738 (2d Cir. 1966).
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See id. at 741.
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doctrine case).169 Stated another way, the court in Gregory was satisfied in calling
the failed reorganization a “sham” when it imposed an implied business purpose
requirement into the meaning of a statutory “reorganization,”170 yet the court in
Goldstein refused to recognize the loan arrangement as a “sham” even though it also
violated an implied “purpose to make a profit” requirement in the statutory meaning
of “indebtedness.”171
Much has been written attempting to explain and clarify the meaning of these
doctrines, including when and where certain of the doctrines should and should not
apply. Although important for academic exploration, such exhausting considerations
appear to be a hopeless endeavor in practical application, as courts are willing to
attach any label to any analysis to prevent tax benefits that it believes are not
intended by Congress. Yet, the IRS must believe that one of these doctrines, the
economic substance doctrine, is applicable to the most tax abusive transactions and,
hence, more deserving of a penalty.
To avoid the strict liability penalty, taxpayers defending against a violation of the
economic substance doctrine may resort to conceding that their transaction should
not be given effect but by reason of a doctrine other than the economic substance
doctrine. While taxpayers would likely be able to show that the substance over form
doctrine or step transaction doctrine are applicable in many cases where the IRS
charges an economic substance violation, the courts will be forced to resolve which
doctrine applies. Having achieved the goal of preventing a transaction not intended
by Congress, the resolution of which doctrine applies to defeat the transaction
matters only because of the imposition of the strict liability penalty. The practical
result may be that courts will choose to apply the economic substance doctrine
instead of another doctrine when a transaction appears to be more egregious and
deserving of a penalty. Take, for example, the recent case Kenna Trading, LLC v.
Commissioner, where the Tax Court disallowed bad debt deductions under the
economic substance doctrine for tax shelters that were created, marketed, and sold
by attorney John Rogers.172 The opinion in Kenna Trading was written by Tax
Court Judge Robert A. Wherry, Jr., who also wrote the opinion in Superior Trading,
LLC v. Commissioner, also involving tax shelters created by Rogers.173 Perhaps
Judge Wherry was “throwing the book” at Rogers in Kenna Trading, which led to
the unfortunate use of “economic substance” language where that doctrine should
not have been applicable.174
169 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 26, at 10. Interestingly, both cases were decided in the
Second Circuit (albeit some years apart).
170

Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 738. In Gregory, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
opinion without using the word “sham.” The opinion, however, did indicate similar language
by calling the transaction a “devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate
reorganization,” as well as “a disguise for concealing its real character” and discussed how
any other holding “would be to exalt artifice above reality.” Gregory, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70
(emphasis added).
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Kenna Trading, LLC v. Comm’r, No. 7551-08, 2014 WL 5471973 (T.C. Oct. 16, 2014).
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Superior Trading, LLC v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 70 (2011).

174 See Amy S. Elliot, Economic Substance Notice’s Sham Treatment Prompts Criticism,
145 TAX NOTES 377, 378 (Oct. 27, 2014).
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Recently Judge Wherry acknowledged in CNT Investors LLC v. Commissioner
that courts have used inconsistent terminology to refer to common-law doctrines,
and uncertainty remains regarding “the scope, contours, and sources of economic
substance and the other, noncodified judicial doctrines.”175 In CNT Investors the
taxpayers owned appreciated real estate through an S corporation and engaged in
Son-of-BOSS transactions in order to create outside basis in a purported partnership
to which the S corporation contributed appreciated real estate.176 After a series of
further transactions, the taxpayers were left holding real estate through the
partnership with no one reporting recognition of the real estate’s built-in gain.177
Upon a challenge by the IRS, the taxpayers conceded the partnership was a sham but
challenged the assessment of the gross valuation misstatement penalty.178
The Tax Court considered the application of the common-law doctrines, found
the step transaction applicable, but refused to enforce the penalty assessment by
finding that the taxpayers relied reasonably and in good faith on independent
professional advice.179 Although the transaction in CNT Investors occurred prior to
codification, commentators have pointed out that had this occurred post-codification,
the government would have invoked the economic substance doctrine, and the
taxpayer would have been subject to the strict liability penalty without the ability to
use the reasonable cause and good faith exception.180 In this scenario, the taxpayer
would try to avoid the penalty by arguing that another doctrine, rather than the
economic substance doctrine, applies. Therefore, the penalty assessment would be
left to the discretion of a court that acknowledged the uncertainty and overlap of the
doctrines.
Attempting to raise a different common-law doctrine other than the economic
substance doctrine to avoid the penalty conflicts with the perception that the
assertion of common-law tax doctrines is largely a “one-way street” open to the
government.181 Typically a taxpayer is open to assert a judicial doctrine only under
the most stringent conditions, such as fraud or mistake.182 The rationale behind this
precept is that the taxpayer, having chosen the form of the transaction, is precluded
from disavowing it.183 Considering this rationale, however, the choice among
175 CNT Inv’rs, LLC v. Comm’r, No. 27539-08, 2015 WL 1285271, at *17 (T.C. Mar. 23,
2015).
176

Id. at *1. While there are many different types of Son-of-BOSS transactions, they all
involve a tax shelter scheme that attempts to eliminate capital gains by creating artificial
capital losses.
177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Id. at *26, *43.
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See Amy S. Elliot, CNT Investors Shines Light on Courts’ Use of Inexact Doctrines,
TAX NOTES TODAY, at 3 (Apr. 6, 2015).
181 See Daniel M. Schneider, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Federal Tax Cases Decided by
Trial Courts, 1993-2006: A Quantitative Assessment, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 35, 50 (2009).
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Id.

183

See Comm’r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967) (“[T]o allow the
Commissioner alone to pierce formal arrangements does not involve any disparity of
treatment because taxpayers have it within their own control to choose in the first place
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doctrines to avoid the strict liability penalty poses a distinct and new issue. Rather
than invoking a doctrine to recast or ignore a transaction’s form, the taxpayer would
merely be arguing that another doctrine is more appropriate in reaching the result the
government is asserting. Courts will now be forced to decide whether a taxpayer has
the ability to argue which of the multiple common-law doctrines should apply in
light of the strict liability penalty context. With the assertion of doctrines no longer
resting on the form of a transaction in this context, it is likely that courts will allow
taxpayers to make this argument.
CONCLUSION
Clarification of the economic substance doctrine by codifying it may have been a
noble objective in establishing uniformity, but the introduction of a strict liability
penalty to transactions failing only this doctrine and—not other common-law
doctrines—adds greater uncertainty to tax law. The penalty provision causes
unnecessary line drawing among doctrines that are all ultimately designed to enforce
Congress’s intent. Taxpayers and courts are now forced to differentiate among the
appropriate applications of each doctrine in order to determine whether the new strict
liability penalty should be imposed. Additionally, courts will be faced with new
questions related to the penalty based predominantly on the differences among these
doctrines. These issues will lead only to more uncertainty, as needless distinctions
are drawn between doctrines that share the same ultimate goal.

whatever arrangements they care to make.”); Bolger v. Comm’r, 59 T.C. 760, 767 n.4 (1973)
(“[T]axpayer may have less freedom than the Commissioner to ignore the transactional form
that he has adopted.”).
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